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OPINION OF THE COURT 
               
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
   
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 The United States and the United States Department of 
Commerce appeal from a final judgment entered on September 17, 
1992, by the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  The court held the United States 
jointly and severally liable, as an "owner," "operator" and 
"arranger," for response costs for which the plaintiff FMC 
Corporation is or will be responsible under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
("CERCLA") to clean up hazardous waste created at an industrial 
facility during World War II.  FMC acquired this facility many 
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years after the war.  The district court entered the final 
judgment in accordance with its opinion of February 19, 1992, 
reported as FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 786 F. 
Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1992).  FMC brought this action because the 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") sought to recover the 
response costs from it.  FMC seeks contribution, claiming that 
the United States also is liable because the War Production Board 
("WPB"), which later was subsumed within the Department of 
Commerce, owned parts of the facility, operated the facility 
during World War II, and arranged for the disposal of the wastes 
created.  FMC and the United States have settled the claim 
against the United States as an "owner," but the government 
contends that its conduct other than as an owner was regulatory 
activity from which the United States is protected from liability 
by its sovereign immunity.  It further argues that, in any event, 
it was neither an "operator" nor an "arranger" within CERCLA. 
Accordingly, it contends that it cannot be liable other than as 
an owner.  We reject the government's contentions and thus will 
affirm. 
 
A. Statutory Background 
 Section 104 of CERCLA empowers the government to use 
money from the "Superfund" to clean up hazardous waste sites.  42 
U.S.C. § 9604(a).  Section 107(a)(1)-(4) provides that any 
"person" who:  (1) is the "owner" or "operator" of a facility 
where there is a release or threat of release of a hazardous 
substance, (2) was the "owner" or "operator" of a facility at the 
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time of the disposal of a hazardous substance, (3) "arranged" for 
such disposal, or (4) "accepted" a hazardous substance for 
transport to a facility, is liable for the response costs, i.e., 
the costs of removal and other remedial action incurred by the 
United States.  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).  Thus, an entity, 
such as FMC, which becomes an owner of a facility after the 
disposal of the hazardous waste is liable under CERCLA. Liability 
for the costs incurred is strict.  United States v. Alcan 
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 1992).  Section 
101(21) defines "person" to include the "United States 
Government."  42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).   
 From its inception, CERCLA has included a provision 
waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States and, as 
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
1986, Pub. L. 99-499, § 120, 100 Stat. 1613, 1666 (1986), CERCLA 
section 120(a)(1) includes the following waiver provision: 
 
Each department, agency, and instrumentality 
of the United States (including the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches 
of government) shall be subject to, and 
comply with this chapter in the same manner 
and to the same extent, both procedurally and 
substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, 
including liability under section 9607 
[CERCLA section 107] of this title. 
42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (emphasis added).   
Persons assessed by the United States with response costs under 
CERCLA may "seek contribution from any other person who is liable 
or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title [CERCLA 
section 107(a)], during or following any civil action under 
section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this 
title."  42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).  Therefore, we are concerned on 
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this appeal with the related but nevertheless distinct questions 
of whether the sovereign immunity of the United States bars this 
action against it, except as an owner, and whether the United 
States, if not immune, is liable either as an operator or an 
arranger, or both. 
 
B. Factual Background 
 The facility at issue in this case is located in Front 
Royal, Virginia, and was owned by American Viscose Corporation 
from 1937 until 1963, when FMC purchased it.  In 1940, American 
Viscose constructed a plant on the Front Royal site and began 
manufacturing textile rayon.  Before World War II, the machines 
at the facility were not set up to produce high tenacity rayon. 
However, after Pearl Harbor, the government determined that the 
country needed increased production of high tenacity rayon for 
the manufacturing of war-related products, including airplane and 
truck tires.  Inasmuch as the demand anticipated for high 
tenacity rayon greatly exceeded the projected supply, the WPB 
commissioned American Viscose to convert its plant to make high 
tenacity rayon and American Viscose did so. 
 Unquestionably, at least by current standards, 
environmental controls were lax at the facility.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that inspections in 1982 revealed carbon disulfide, a 
chemical used in manufacturing high tenacity rayon, in the ground 
water in the vicinity of the plant.  Consequently, the EPA began 
cleanup operations and notified FMC of its potential liability 
under CERCLA.  In 1990, FMC filed this suit against the 
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Department of Commerce under section 113(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(f), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-
02.  FMC alleged that, as a result of the government's activities 
during World War II, the United States was jointly liable with 
FMC as an "owner" and "operator" of the facility, and as an 
"arranger for disposal" of hazardous wastes there.  In 
particular, FMC claimed that the government became involved so 
pervasively in the facility that it effectively operated the 
plant along with American Viscose and, accordingly, should share 
in the response costs. 
 The government filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that 
the United States could not be shown to have been an operator or 
an arranger for disposal within the meaning of CERCLA, as its 
activities affecting the facility were regulatory.  The district 
court rejected the government's position, holding that the United 
States is liable, regardless of the nature of its activities, 
whenever the government's "involvement or control become[s] so 
pervasive or significant as to warrant the imposition of CERCLA 
liability."   
 In a subsequent motion for partial summary judgment, 
the government argued that it had not waived sovereign immunity 
under CERCLA for purely regulatory activities and that, in any 
event, its activities at the site did not rise to the level of 
ownership or operation necessary for the imposition of liability 
under the statute.  The district court denied the motion, holding 
that there were disputes of material fact relating to the owner 
and operator issues concerning the extent of the government's 
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activities at the plant.  In March 1991, the district court held 
a four-day non-jury trial on the liability issues. 
 Subsequently, in an opinion issued February 20, 1992, 
the district court held the government liable on all three 
theories articulated by FMC: as an owner, operator, and arranger. 
See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 786 F. Supp. 
471.  The liability period for these categories varied, and no 
period was identified specifically for "arranger" liability, but 
all fell between January 1942 and March 1948. 
 The trial consisted largely of the introduction of 
documents as most persons with knowledge of the activities at the 
facility during the war had died.  But the parties also 
introduced depositions, and there was some in-court testimony. 
Based on this evidence, the district court made extensive 
findings of fact, many if not most of which are not in dispute, 
and which we only need summarize. 
 The facility is a 440-acre site and includes a 
manufacturing plant and 23 waste disposal basins and landfill 
areas.  The plant was owned and operated by American Viscose from 
1940 to 1963, FMC from 1963 to 1976, and Avtex Fibers-Front 
Royal, Inc. from 1976 to 1989.  American Viscose is now out of 
business, and Avtex is in bankruptcy reorganization.  Id. 
 In January 1942, an executive order established the 
WPB.  The WPB was empowered to issue directives to industry 
regarding war procurement and production, including directives 
concerning purchasing, contracting, specifications, construction, 
requisitioning, plant expansion, conversion, and financing. 
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Moreover, in 1942, the WPB's powers were expanded to include the 
seizure and operation of non-complying industries.  Id. at 474-
75. 
 At the outset of the war, the United States lost 90% of 
its crude rubber supply because the Japanese occupied parts of 
Asia from which this country previously had obtained rubber. 
Consequently, we turned to synthetic substitutes, like high 
tenacity rayon, to strengthen and lengthen the life of heavy duty 
truck and aircraft tires, thus reducing natural rubber 
consumption.  The WPB designated high tenacity rayon as "one of 
the most critical [products] in the entire production program." 
Id. at 474-75.  The WPB required American Viscose to convert the 
Front Royal facility to enable it to produce high tenacity rayon, 
and the facility became one of the few plants in the country 
manufacturing that product.  The WPB's requirement that American 
Viscose convert the facility and expand its capacity to produce 
high tenacity rayon diverted the facility's resources from the 
production of regular textile rayon.  Id. at 477. 
   The government considered facilities producing high 
tenacity rayon to be "war plants" subject to its maximum control. 
The director of the WPB's Textile, Clothing and Leather Division, 
the division directly responsible for high tenacity rayon, 
regarded the American Viscose facility to a considerable extent 
to be a government project directly related to the war effort. 
Inasmuch as the facility was used for a program critical to the 
success of the war effort, if American Viscose did not comply 
with the government's production requirements, the government 
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would have seized the facility.  Indeed, during the war the 
government took over numerous plants which failed to meet 
production requirements, including a plant producing high 
tenacity rayon owned by American Enka Corporation.  Id. at 475-
76. 
 To implement the required plant conversion and 
expansion, the government through the Defense Plant Corporation 
("DPC") leased government-owned equipment and machinery for use 
at the facility, including 50 spinning machines, an acid spin 
bath system, piping for the spinning machines and spin bath 
system, slashing equipment, and waste trucks.  But the government 
did not allow American Viscose to install the leased equipment. 
Instead, the government contracted with Rust Engineering Company 
to design and install the DPC-owned equipment at the facility. 
Under its contract with Rust, the government had substantial 
control over and participation in the work related to the DPC 
equipment.  For example, all plans, specifications, and drawings 
were submitted to the DPC for approval; Rust had to obtain prior 
DPC approval for the purchase of supplies; DPC could promulgate 
rules governing all operations at the work site and require the 
removal from work of any Rust employee; and DPC was represented 
on-site by a government representative, who had the right to 
direct Rust.  The government collected rent from American Viscose 
on the machinery through 1947, and owned the machinery until 
March 1948.  Id. at 478. 
 The five principal components of high tenacity rayon, 
sulfuric acid, carbon bisulfide, wood pulp, chemical cotton 
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liners, and zinc, were quite scarce during the war.  To assure 
American Viscose an adequate supply of sulfuric acid, the 
government built and retained ownership of a sulfuric acid plant 
adjacent to the facility.  The plant was connected to the 
facility through a pipeline, and virtually its entire output was 
delivered through the pipeline.  To satisfy the facility's need 
for carbon bisulfide, the government commissioned Stauffer 
Chemical Company to build a plant in the Front Royal area to 
produce 26.4 million pounds of carbon bisulfide per year.  The 
government required American Viscose to use the raw materials 
that it obtained from the government or through the use of a 
government priority rating system for the specific purpose 
authorized.  As a result of the government's involvement in the 
production of the basic raw materials necessary for manufacturing 
high tenacity rayon, and its control over the distribution of 
these raw materials, it determined the operating level of each 
rayon manufacturer.  Id. at 479-80. 
 In October 1942, the WPB ascertained that the labor 
force in the Front Royal area would be inadequate to meet future 
needs at the facility.  Consequently, the government obtained 
draft deferments for personnel at the facility, directed workers 
in other industries to come to the plant, and provided housing 
for the additional workers.  The government also participated in 
managing and supervising the workers, by sending personnel to 
investigate and resolve problems involving worker productivity, 
to cut down on absenteeism, and to resolve labor disputes.  In 
May 1944, the WPB appointed a full-time representative to reside 
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at Front Royal to address problems at the facility concerning 
manpower, housing, community services, and other related matters. 
Moreover, although the government did not hire the employees, it 
was obligated to reimburse American Viscose for the salaries of 
certain employees under a lease between the DPC and American 
Viscose.  Id. at 480-81. 
 After production began, the government placed a 
representative on-site with the authority to promulgate rules 
governing all operations at the site and to remove workers who 
were incompetent or guilty of misconduct.  Through continuous 
informal contacts and communications, the government was involved 
directly and substantially with the facility's production 
activities and management decisions.  Id.  The government 
controlled the supply and price of American Viscose's raw 
materials as well as the production level and the price of its 
product.  Therefore, inasmuch as the facility was doing only 
government mandated work, the government significantly influenced 
the profit that American Viscose could make at the facility.  Id. 
at 483.  Of course, the government was the end-user of almost all 
of the product manufactured at the facility, either because it 
purchased the product directly or because the product was sold to 
other industries for use in war materials. 
 The government knew that generation of hazardous waste 
inhered in the production process because its personnel present 
at the facility witnessed a large amount of highly visible waste 
disposal activity.  Wastes were placed in large unlined basins 
located on site and, as basins were filled, new ones were dug. 
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Portions of the sulfuric acid utilized in the production process 
that could not be reclaimed or treated at the facility were 
deposited in the on-site waste basins, as were carbon bisulfide 
and zinc contaminated wastes.  From 1942 through 1945, at least 
65,500 cubic yards of viscose waste were placed in the on-site 
basins.  The disposal basins were visible to any person visiting 
the facility.    
 Inasmuch as the generation of waste was inherent in the 
production of high tenacity rayon, an increase in production 
automatically increased waste.  This fact is significant because 
governmental pressure to maximize production overtaxed the 
machinery and equipment at the facility, thereby increasing the 
amount of material scrapped for disposal in the waste basins. 
Moreover, the government rejected material not adhering strictly 
to the production specifications, thereby further increasing the 
amount of waste.  In addition, wastes were generated and disposed 
of by the government-owned equipment that was installed at the 
facility.  Id. at 483-84. 
 The district court concluded that the government was an 
owner and operator of the facility and an arranger of waste 
disposal.  It predicated these conclusions on its factual 
findings, which can be summarized as follows: 
  (1) the government required American Viscose to 
stop making regular rayon and start producing high tenacity 
rayon; 
  (2) the government mandated the amount and 
specifications of the rayon produced and the selling price; 
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  (3) the government owned the equipment used to 
make the high tenacity rayon and owned a plant used to make raw 
materials; 
  (4) the government supervised the production 
process through the enactment of specifications and the placement 
of on-site supervisors and inspectors; it supervised the workers; 
and it had the power to fire workers or seize the plant if its 
orders were not followed; and 
  (5) the government knew that generation of waste 
inhered in the production process; it was aware of the methods 
for disposal of the waste; and it provided the equipment for the 
waste disposal.  
 After making its factual findings and conclusions of 
law, the district court ordered the case to trial to determine 
the allocation of liability between FMC and the government. 
However, FMC and the government settled the allocation issues, 
subject to the government's right to appeal the ruling holding it 
liable as an operator and arranger.  Under the settlement, the 
government conceded its liability as an owner with respect to its 
property at the facility and accepted an allocation of 8% of the 
cleanup costs as owner.  But if we uphold the government's 
liability as an operator and arranger, its total liability under 
the settlement agreement will be increased to 26% of the cleanup 
costs.  The government asserts that if it is held liable on all 
three theories, it will be responsible for between $26,000,000 
and $78,000,000, a figure which FMC suggests is overstated.  On 
September 17, 1992, in accordance with the parties' agreement and 
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the district court's opinion issued on February 20, 1992, the 
court entered final judgment. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The Government filed a timely notice of appeal on 
November 11, 1992.   We have jurisdiction pursuant 28 U.S.C. 
§1291.  The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C §§ 9613(b) and 9613(f). 
We may set aside the district court's findings of fact only if 
they are clearly erroneous.  Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, 
Inc., 909 F.2d 747, 749 (3d Cir. 1990).  Our standard of review 
with respect to alleged error in applying the law to the facts, 
however, is plenary.  Id.   
 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Sovereign Immunity 
 The government's first argument is that the United 
States did not waive its sovereign immunity under CERCLA for 
claims arising from its wartime regulatory activities even though 
CERCLA section 120(a)(1) provides that "[e]ach department, 
agency, and instrumentality of the United States . . . shall be 
subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner and 
to the same extent . . . as any nongovernmental entity including 
liability under section" 107 of CERCLA.  42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1). 
This argument starts from the well-settled principle that the 
federal government is immune from suit "save as it consents to be 
sued."  United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 
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953 (1976).  Furthermore, such consent "cannot be implied but 
must be unequivocally expressed," id., 96 S.Ct. 953-54, and 
waivers of sovereign immunity must be construed narrowly in favor 
of the government.  United States v. Idaho, 113 S.Ct. 1893, 1896 
(1993); United States v. Nordic Village Inc., 112 S.Ct. 1011, 
1015 (1992).  But see FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S.Ct. 996, 1003 (1994). 
Accordingly, the government contends that CERCLA's waiver, 
although express, is not unlimited and that we must construe it 
narrowly.  Based on a series of cases involving suits brought by 
the owners of waste sites against the EPA for its activities in 
taking over these sites for cleaning, the government argues that 
the CERCLA waiver does not apply to federal regulatory actions 
that a non-governmental entity cannot undertake.  Thus, it argues 
that because most of the WPB's activities impacting on the 
facility were regulatory we must discount them in our analysis of 
the government's possible liability.  In its view, its remaining 
non-regulatory activities did not involve the government 
sufficiently with American Viscose to justify the imposition of 
CERCLA liability on the government. 
  In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig., 790 F. Supp. 94, 95-96 
(E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 980 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1992) (table), is an 
example of the type of case on which the government relies. 
There, the EPA took over a hazardous waste site in order to clean 
it up.  In so doing, the EPA allegedly caused the further release 
of hazardous waste.  Based on this release, the site's owner sued 
the EPA for contribution and indemnification for response costs. 
The owner argued that the EPA became an operator under CERCLA 
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when it conducted the cleanup activities at the site.  The 
district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the United 
States does not subject itself to liability as an operator when 
it is engaged in cleanup activities at a hazardous waste site. 
Rather, the United States "would be liable under section 107(a) 
of CERCLA if it was acting in a manner other than in its 
regulatory capacity."  790 F. Supp. at 97. 
 Similarly, in another case where an owner alleged that 
the EPA became an "owner" or "operator" by taking over a waste 
site to initiate a cleanup, a district court held that the waiver 
of sovereign immunity under CERCLA is limited.  United States v. 
Atlas Minerals and Chems., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 411, 420 (E.D. Pa. 
1992).  "[T]he waiver contained in [CERCLA section 120(a)(1)] 
only applies to situations in which the government has acted as a 
business," and "does not extend to situations in which the EPA 
has undertaken response or remedial actions at a hazardous waste 
site."  The court reached this conclusion because:  
 
when the EPA undertakes such actions, it is 
not acting like a private party; it is acting 
to ameliorate a dangerous situation that, but 
for the prior actions of the generators and 
transporters of the hazardous waste, would 
not exist. 
797 F. Supp. at 421.  See also Reading Co. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 155 B.R. 890, 897 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (indicating that 
the "government, unlike private parties, has a regulatory and 
response duty to assume a clean-up role.  Therefore, inasmuch as 
a government, unlike private entities, must act to remedy 
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environmental crises, a government cannot, in such circumstances, 
be considered an owner, operator or arranger for CERCLA 
purposes"). 
 The government contends that these cases establish a 
per se rule that regulatory activities cannot constitute the 
basis for CERCLA liability, because only a government can 
regulate.  However, we think the distinction the government is 
trying to draw between regulatory and non-regulatory activities 
misreads CERCLA and the case law.  In the first place, section 
120(a)(1) does not state that regulatory activities cannot form 
the basis of liability.  Rather, it states that the government is 
liable in the same manner and to the same extent as any non-
governmental entity.  Thus, when the government engages in 
activities that would make a private party liable if the private 
party engaged in those types of activities, then the government 
is also liable.  This is true even if no private party could in 
fact engage in those specific activities.  For example, although 
no private party could own a military base, the government is 
liable for clean up of hazardous wastes at military bases because 
a private party would be liable if it did own a military base. 
Cf. United States v. Allied Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20061, 
at *7-9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1990) (United States Navy found 
liable under CERCLA because it authorized demolition which caused 
release of hazardous substances).  Just as the government can be 
liable for hazardous wastes created at a military base it owns, 
the government can be liable when it engages in regulatory 
activities extensive enough to make it an operator of a facility 
18 
or an arranger of the disposal of hazardous wastes even though no 
private party could engage in the regulatory activities at issue. 
 Our conclusion is consistent with our approach to 
statutory construction in general, and to CERCLA in particular, 
which is to read plain language to mean what it says.  Alcan 
Aluminum, 964 F.2d at 260.  This conclusion is bolstered by 
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122 
(1955), in which the Supreme Court interpreted the provision of 
the Federal Tort Claims Act stating that, "[t]he United States 
shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the same extent 
as a private individual under like circumstances," 28 U.S.C. 
§2674, to waive sovereign immunity even with respect to 
activities which private persons do not perform.  The Court 
stated that, "all Government activity is inescapably 'uniquely 
governmental' in that it is performed by the Government."  Id. at 
67, 76 S.Ct. at 126.  We find Indian Towing controlling.   
 Moreover, we disagree with the dissent's 
characterization of the "activity at issue" in this case. 
Typescript at 3.  The dissent describes "the activity at issue 
here" as "mobilizing the private economy in the war effort," and 
concludes that the government cannot be held liable for this 
activity because "no private party can replicate [it]."  Id.  In 
our opinion, the mobilization of the private economy was the 
purpose of the government's activity at the Front Royal site and 
the war provided the authority for its activities.  However, we 
would characterize the "activity at issue here" as the day-to-day 
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actions taken by the government with relation to the Front Royal 
site and adjudicate the case from that perspective. 
 Our reading of section 120(a)(1) comports with the rest 
of CERCLA.  First of all, the government's contention is 
inconsistent with our previous recognition that "CERCLA is a 
remedial statute which should be construed liberally to 
effectuate its goals."  Alcan Aluminum, 964 F.2d at 258.  In 
practice, the "regulatory" exception suggested by the government 
would be inconsistent "with CERCLA's broad remedial purposes, 
most importantly its essential purpose of making those 
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical 
poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the 
harmful conditions they created."  Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water 
Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  See also United States v. 
Azrael, 765 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (D. Md. 1991) (party benefiting 
from commercial activity should internalize health and 
environmental costs of the activity into costs of doing 
business).  By placing the burden of cleanups on responsible 
parties, CERCLA was intended to "serve[] as an incentive for the 
sound treatment and handling of hazardous substances."  125 Cong. 
Rec. 17989 (1979) (statement of Senator John C. Culver of Iowa), 
reprinted in, 1 Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 
A Legislative History of CERCLA, Pub. Law 96-510 at 148-49 (Comm. 
Print 1983).  Accordingly, if the United States, even as a 
regulator, operates a hazardous waste facility or arranges for 
the treatment or disposal of hazardous wastes, it should be held 
20 
responsible for cleanup costs, just as any private business would 
be, so that it will "'internalize' the full costs . . . [that 
hazardous] substances impose on society and on the environment." 
United States v. Atlas Minerals and Chems., Inc., 797 F. Supp. at 
413 n.1.    
 Second, our reading comports with the rest of CERCLA 
because section 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b), lists the only three 
defenses to section 107 liability available to any person, 
including the government.  See Alcan Aluminum, 964 F.2d at 265. 
These enumerated defenses do not include the "regulatory" 
exception which the government seeks to create and on which it 
relies.  Of course, in view of the plain waiver of sovereign 
immunity in section 120, which places the government in the same 
position as a nongovernmental entity, we cannot hold that a 
regulatory defense provision is not required to uphold the 
government's position on a theory that regulatory activity can 
never form the basis for liability under CERCLA.  We also point 
out that our approach is consistent with United States v. Rohm 
and Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1276 (3d Cir. 1993), in which we 
refused to read the term "removal" in CERCLA section 101(23) to 
include governmental oversight of private remedial actions, in 
part because we found "it highly significant that Congress 
omitted any mention of oversight . . . in the definition of 
removal."  Just as we would not read undesignated conduct into 
the definition of "removal," we will not read the broad 
regulatory exception advanced by the government into section 
107(b) or section 120(a)(1). 
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 Section 107(d)(2) provides further evidence that our 
reading of section 120(a)(1) comports with the rest of CERCLA. 
Although CERCLA permits the imposition of liability on states and 
local governments for cleanup costs, section 107(d)(2) expressly 
immunizes them from liability for actions "taken in response to 
an emergency created by the release or threatened release of a 
hazardous substance generated by or from a facility owned by 
another person."  42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2).  Congress's creation of 
an exception for cleanup activities by state and local 
governments plainly shows that it intended to treat these 
activities differently from other government activities. 
Accordingly, CERCLA does not protect a government from liability 
simply because it acts in a regulatory capacity.  Rather, a 
government is protected under section 107(d)(2) because it is 
responding to an environmental emergency.   
 We do not mean to suggest that the cases relied on by 
the government which we have cited were decided wrongly.  All of 
those cases involved governmental regulatory activities 
undertaken solely with the purpose of cleaning up hazardous 
materials -- activities undertaken "to ameliorate a dangerous 
situation that, but for the prior action of the generators and 
transporters of the hazardous waste, would not exist."  See 
United States v. Atlas Minerals and Chems., Inc., 797 F. Supp. at 
421.  We do not think that CERCLA's "essential purpose of making 
those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical 
poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the 
harmful conditions they created," Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 
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1221 (internal quotation marks omitted), is served by making the 
government liable for attempting to clean up wastes created by 
others.  CERCLA does not intend to discourage the government from 
making cleanup efforts by making the government liable for such 
efforts. 
 We believe that Congress intended to treat the federal 
government in the same manner as state and local governments. 
Thus, it stands to reason that inasmuch as state and local 
governments are immune from CERCLA liability for the consequences 
of cleanup activities in response to emergencies created by 
others, but not for the consequences of regulatory conduct in 
general, we should read this distinction as implied in the 
federal government's waiver of sovereign immunity as well.0  
 Because the government's involvement with the American 
Viscose plant was not in response to a threatened release of 
hazardous materials, we hold that the relevant sovereign immunity 
question under CERCLA is not whether the government was acting in 
a regulatory capacity, but whether its activities, however 
characterized, are sufficient to impose liability on the 
government as an owner, operator, or arranger.  Hence, we 
consider both the government's regulatory and non-regulatory 
activities with respect to the facility during the war and 
determine whether these activities taken in toto were of the type 
                     
0Judge Alito does not join the preceding two paragraphs of this 
opinion.  He does not believe that the question whether the 
government may be liable for cleanup activities is before the 
court in this case, and therefore he does not think that the 
court should opine upon it. 
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commonly associated with being an operator or arranger under 
CERCLA and are the type of activities in which private parties 
could engage.  We need not consider the "owner" question as the 
parties have settled that issue.  Thus, the liability issue is 
simply whether the government is liable as an operator or 
arranger.  See FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S.Ct. at 1004. 
 In reaching our result, we recognize that section 
120(a)(1) which waives sovereign immunity is a portion of a 
section entitled "Federal facilities," thus permitting an 
argument to be made that Congress only intended to impose 
liability on the United States under CERCLA for federally owned   
facilities.  That argument, however, is unavailing for three 
reasons.   
 First, of course, the language of section 120(a)(1) 
does not limit government liability to federally owned 
facilities.  Rather, section 120(a)(1) deals with the application 
of CERCLA to the "Federal Government" "[i]n general," and it 
imposes liability on the government to the same extent as 
liability is imposed on "any nongovernmental entity."  Second, 
even though Congress added section 120 dealing with "Federal 
facilities" to CERCLA in 1986, see Pub. L. No. 99-499, Title I, 
§120, 100 Stat. 1666, Congress waived sovereign immunity in the 
original version of CERCLA in 1980 in language not materially 
different from the amended language in 1986.  Thus, Pub. L. No. 
96-510, Title I, § 107(g), 94 Stat. 2783, an original CERCLA 
provision, provided that "[e]ach department, agency, or 
instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial 
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branches of the Federal Government shall be subject to, and 
comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the same 
extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any 
nongovernmental entity, including liability under this section." 
This waiver provision was not linked to the federal facilities 
section, as that section did not exist in 1980.   
 Third, in 1986, when Congress moved the sovereign 
immunity waiver provision from section 107 to section 120, it 
provided that the governmental entities would be subject to 
"liability under section" 107.  This reference was an exact 
counterpart to language in section 107 as originally enacted, as 
that provision provided that the governmental entities would be 
subject to "liability under this section."  Thus, Congress did 
not expressly limit the scope of the waiver.        
 Inasmuch as Congress did nothing in terms in 1986 to 
narrow its earlier waiver of sovereign immunity, it would be 
unreasonable for us to infer that it impliedly limited its 
original waiver by moving the waiver section.  Indeed, if 
anything, through its enactment of section 120, Congress 
reemphasized its intention that CERCLA be applied to the 
government.  Overall, we think it is quite clear that the 
transfer of the waiver of sovereign immunity provision was 
nothing more than a logical reordering of the waiver provision 
accompanying the enactment of section 120.0  Accordingly, we now 
                     
0We also point out that it would be difficult to understand why 
Congress would have limited the waiver of sovereign immunity to 
activities at federally owned facilities.  In this regard, we 
only need point to Alcan Aluminum and then consider whether 
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pass to the questions of whether the United States is liable as 
an operator and arranger. 
B. Operator Liability 
 The definition of "operator" in CERCLA gives little 
guidance to the courts in determining if a particular person or 
entity is liable as an operator because the statute circularly 
defines "operator" as "any person . . . operating such facility." 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii).  Fortunately, however, the case law 
provides us with criteria for identifying those who qualify as 
"operators" under CERCLA.   
 We start our discussion of whether the government was 
an operator by considering our opinion in Lansford-Coaldale Joint 
Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209.  In that case, we 
adopted the "actual control" test in determining whether operator 
liability should be imposed on one corporation for the acts of a 
related corporation.  The actual control test imposes liability 
which would not be consistent with "traditional rules of limited 
liability for corporations" but nevertheless is consistent "with 
                                                                  
Congress intended that a private corporation but not the 
government could be liable for response costs caused by the 
deposit of liquid wastes generated at its facility into the 
Borehole and subsequently released into the river.  964 F.2d at 
255-56.  Moreover, the discussion of the facts underlying Key 
Tronic Corp. v. United States, 62 U.S.L.W. 4441, 4442 (U.S. June 
6, 1994), indicates that the United States Air Force agreed to 
settle a suit brought against it by the EPA under CERCLA charging 
that it was liable for response costs as one of multiple parties 
that used a site for the disposal of liquid chemicals which later 
contaminated the water in the surrounding area.  According to Key 
Tronic Corp., the Air Force agreed to pay the EPA $1.45 million. 
Thus, the government itself does not treat the waiver of 
sovereign immunity as being limited to federal facilities. 
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CERCLA's broad remedial purposes, most importantly its essential 
purpose of making those responsible for problems caused by the 
disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility 
for remedying the harmful conditions they created."  Id. at 1221 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Under this test, a 
corporation will be liable for the environmental violations of 
another corporation if there is evidence that it exercised 
"substantial control" over the other corporation.  Id.  At a 
minimum, substantial control requires "active involvement in the 
activities" of the other corporation.  Id. at 1222.  While 
Lansford-Coaldale arose in the context of related corporations, 
it is nevertheless instructive here. 
 In our view, it is clear that the government had 
"substantial control" over the facility and had "active 
involvement in the activities" there.  The government determined 
what product the facility would manufacture, controlled the 
supply and price of the facility's raw materials, in part by 
building or causing plants to be built near the facility for 
their production, supplied equipment for use in the manufacturing 
process, acted to ensure that the facility retained an adequate 
labor force, participated in the management and supervision of 
the labor force, had the authority to remove workers who were 
incompetent or guilty of misconduct, controlled the price of the 
facility's product, and controlled who could purchase the 
product.  While the government challenges some of the district 
court's findings, it simply cannot quarrel reasonably with the 
court's conclusions regarding the basic situation at the 
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facility.  In particular, the government reasonably cannot 
quarrel with the conclusion that the leading indicia of control 
were present, as the government determined what product the 
facility would produce, the level of production, the price of the 
product, and to whom the product would be sold.   
 In these circumstances, we must conclude that the 
government was an operator of the facility unless we overrule or 
narrowly limit the unanimous panel decision in Lansford-Coaldale, 
a step we will not take.  Instead, we look to other cases which 
construe "operator" insofar as they inform the overarching 
Lansford-Coaldale test of actual and substantial control over 
"the corporation's day-to-day operations and its policy making 
decisions."  Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1222.  The government's 
argument is no stronger, for under section 120 it is in the same 
position "as any nongovernmental entity" with respect to CERCLA 
liability.  None of these factors is dispositive, and each is 
important only to the extent it is evidence of substantial, 
actual control. 
 For example, in United States v. New Castle County, 727 
F. Supp. 854, 869 (D. Del. 1989), the district court listed the 
following factors as being relevant: whether the person or entity 
controlled the finances of the facility; managed the employees of 
the facility; managed the daily business operations of the 
facility; was responsible for the maintenance of environmental 
control at the facility; and conferred or received any commercial 
or economic benefit from the facility, other than the payment or 
receipt of taxes.  Another court in deciding whether a parent 
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could be liable as an operator along with the subsidiary, stated 
that courts should consider:  whether the parent has the power to 
direct the activities of persons who control mechanisms causing 
the pollution; whether and to what extent the parent controls the 
subsidiary's marketing; whether the parent can execute contracts 
on behalf of the subsidiary; and whether the parent controls 
hiring, supervision, transfer and similar aspects of employment 
at the subsidiary.  Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 1987 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14254, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,578 (D. Colo. Apr. 29, 
1987).0 
 Courts have applied the Lansford-Coaldale standard and 
factors such as those considered in New Castle County and Idarado 
Mining in considering a state or local government's liability as 
an operator under CERCLA.  For example, in United States v. 
Stringfellow, supra, a special master concluded that California 
was liable under CERCLA as an operator and owner of a landfill. 
The special master noted that the state chose the location for 
the landfill, designed and constructed the site, hired, directed 
and supervised the employees with day-to-day operational 
responsibility for the site, and set the responsibilities for 
these employees. 
                     
0On an appeal from a mandatory injunction issued on February 22, 
1989, ordering the state's cleanup plan implemented, the parent 
challenged the earlier finding of the district court that it was 
an operator.  However, the court of appeals decided the case 
without reaching this issue.  Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 
F.2d 1486, 1491 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1584 
(1991). 
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 In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed a district court finding that the South Carolina 
Department of Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC") was not 
an owner or operator of the abandoned Fort Lawn waste site. 
United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988). 
In Dart, the generators of the hazardous wastes alleged, in their 
third-party complaint, that DHEC was liable under CERCLA because 
it controlled the activities at the site pursuant to a South 
Carolina statute that gave it regulatory powers such as the power 
to approve and disapprove applications to store wastes at the 
site, to inspect the site, and to regulate the transportation of 
the wastes delivered to Fort Lawn.  The court of appeals found 
that DHEC did not have operator status because there was no 
evidence that it directly managed the waste site's employees or 
finances or ran the day-to-day activities of the facility.  Thus, 
DHEC did not engage in "hands on" activities contributing to the 
release of hazardous wastes.  Similarly, in New Castle County, 
727 F. Supp. 854, the district court declined to find the state 
liable as an operator of a landfill where it only periodically 
inspected the site and mandated the details of refuse soil 
compaction and construction, but did not manage the day-to-day 
operations of the landfill.  But Dart and New Castle County are 
distinguishable because in neither case did the governmental 
entity implicated have the control that the federal government 
exercised at Front Royal, and in neither case was the 
governmental entity involved in the facility for the purpose of 
obtaining a product for its own use. 
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 The government exerted considerable day-to-day control 
over American Viscose, and at the risk of being repetitious, we 
will explain why.  In the first place, American Viscose would not 
have been making high tenacity rayon if not at the government's 
direction.  To obtain the commercial product it needed, the 
government diverted American Viscose from its previous commercial 
endeavors.  Thus, every day American Viscose did what the 
government ordered it to do.  Second, although the government 
officials and employees personally did not take over the plant, 
the government maintained a significant degree of control over 
the production process through regulations, on-site inspectors, 
and the possibility of seizure.  Third, the government built or 
had built plants supplying raw materials to American Viscose, 
controlled these plants, arranged for an increased labor force, 
and supervised employee conduct, at least to the extent of 
helping American Viscose deal with labor disputes and worker 
absenteeism.  Fourth, the government supplied machinery and 
equipment for use in the manufacturing process.  Fifth, the 
government controlled product marketing and price.  Given this 
degree of control, and given the fact that the wastes would not 
have been created if not for the government's activities, the 
government is liable as an operator.  Indeed, on the record 
before us, if we rejected the district court's conclusion that 
the government was an operator, we would create a precedent 
completely out of harmony with the case law on what makes a 
person an operator under CERCLA. 
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 We are well aware that the government seeks to minimize 
the scope of its involvement in American Viscose's activities by 
arguing that its involvement revolved around the government-owned 
equipment and machinery at the facility.  While we do not doubt 
that the government was concerned with that machinery and 
equipment, it was involved with the facility's operations as a 
whole.  In order to demonstrate the government's overall 
participation in the operation of the facility, we shall make 
reference to representative evidence in the record.  
 We consider the minutes of a meeting held on March 7, 
1944, attended by ten representatives of the WPB, three from 
American Viscose, and one from Rust Engineering.  See app. at 
1716.  O.T. Rhodes, a consultant to the Tire Cord Branch of the 
WPB, opened the meeting by indicating that its "stated purpose" 
was "to iron out Housing, Transportation, and Manpower Problems 
at Front Royal, Virginia, area."  During the course of the 
meeting, American Viscose's Front Royal manager discussed labor 
and transportation problems with the WPB representatives who were 
concerned with their alleviation.  At one point, when American 
Viscose identified problems resulting from the draft, a WPB 
representative noted that "Front Royal will notify us here in 
case they get into a jam on any individual."  App. at 1720.  He 
then indicated that "It was agreed on unanimously that a WPB 
Priorities man was needed on the Housing situation."  Id.  The 
government's concerns at this meeting simply cannot reasonably be 
regarded as being confined to a concern over its equipment and 
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machinery or be characterized as that of an ordinary purchaser of 
a product from a manufacturer. 
 A letter between high-level government officials on 
March 14, 1944, demonstrates the real situation at the facility. 
On that day Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the WPB, wrote to Paul 
V. McNutt, Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, as follows: 
 As you know the War Production Board 
considers the production of tire type high-
tenacity rayon one of the most critical in 
the entire production program.  It calls for 
an expansion from an annual rate of 66 
million pounds in August, 1943 to 240 million 
pounds for the year 1944.  One-third of the 
expansion will be accounted for by the new 
facilities projected by the American Viscose 
Corporation at Front Royal, Virginia. 
  
 It has been reported to me that the 
preparations for manning the Front Royal 
plant have been, in the judgment of the local 
management and other responsible people, 
inadequate to meet the production 
requirements.  I would like to request that 
you assign immediately representatives of 
your staff to go into this question with men 
who are responsible for this production in 
the War Production Board.  I am asking Mr. 
Golden's staff to act as the clearance point 
in this matter.  App. at 1746. 
 
 As the foregoing documents make plain, it simply is not 
accurate to say that the government's activities at the facility 
were limited to government-owned equipment and machinery, when 
the government's overriding concern was the efficient operation 
of the facility as a whole.  The government's interest in the 
facility's operation was, of course, understandable because in 
the parlance of the 1940's used to explain the many dislocations 
of the times, "There's a war on."  It was altogether natural and 
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appropriate for government representatives to participate in 
decisions concerning the production of a product which WPB 
chairman Nelson characterized as "one of the most critical in the 
entire production program."  Overall, unless we adopt a 
revisionist view of history, when we consider "the totality of 
the circumstances presented" we cannot reject the district 
court's "inherently fact-intensive" conclusion that the 
government was an operator of the facility.  See Lansford-
Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1222. 
 
C. Arranger Liability 
 The government also argues that it is not liable under 
section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3), as an 
arranger for the disposal or treatment of hazardous wastes.  The 
court is equally divided on this point and consequently we will 
affirm the judgment of the district court holding the government 
liable as an arranger without discussion.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 We conclude with one final point.  In its brief, the 
government urges that its potential liability under the district 
court's opinion "is massive and far outpaces anything Congress 
could have imagined, much less intended" when it adopted section 
120(a).  Indeed, it contends that in this case alone it will be 
responsible for between $26,000,000 and $78,000,000, if we affirm 
the district court, and it goes so far as to list other pending 
cases which it indicates "involve the same or similar issues to 
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those presented in this appeal."  While it may be true that 
application of the principles in this case by other courts could 
lead to the imposition of broad liability on the government,0 
that circumstance cannot influence our result as we cannot amend 
CERCLA by judicial fiat.  Rather, our approach must be the same 
as that of the Supreme Court when responding to an argument that 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 
U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., was being applied too broadly:  "this 
defect - if defect it is - is inherent in the statute as written, 
and its correction must lie with Congress."  Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. 
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3286-87 (1985). 
Furthermore, we point out that at bottom our result simply places 
a cost of the war on the United States, and thus on society as a 
whole, a result which is neither untoward nor inconsistent with 
the policy underlying CERCLA. 
 We will affirm the judgment of the district court of 
September 17, 1992. 
               
 
 
 
                     
0Of course, this outcome is by no means a certainty, as the 
degree of governmental involvement at other facilities may not 
have equaled that at Front Royal.  As we emphasized in Lansford-
Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1222, the "determination whether a 
corporation has exerted sufficient control to warrant imposition 
of operator liability requires an inherently fact-intensive 
inquiry."  Thus, our opinion obviously cannot be applied in other 
situations involving wartime production without an analysis of 
the facts in those cases. 
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FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce., No. 92-1945  
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge, dissenting with whom Judges Cowen and Roth join, and with whom 
Judge Stapleton joins as to Part II. 
 I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that the intense activity 
undertaken by the United States during World War II in coordinating and steering the 
country's private industries to insure that they would produce the war supplies necessary 
to mount the country's military operations subjects the United States to liability as an 
"operator" and "arranger" under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA).  I believe that Congress did not waive the sovereign immunity 
of the United States for this unique governmental activity.  The broad imposition of 
liability that the majority opinion places on the government is unique in the history of 
CERCLA and will have consequences far beyond any manifested intent of Congress.  In any 
event, the quantum and nature of the government's activities set forth on this record do 
not rise to the statutory "operator" and "arranger" level. 
I. 
 It is of course well established that the government waives only so much of its 
sovereign immunity as it has chosen to waive in clear and express language.  See United 
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).  That CERCLA contains a waiver of some of the 
government's sovereign immunity is undisputed. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 
1, 10 (1989). 
 The relevant provision, located significantly in the section entitled "Federal 
facilities," states: 
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States 
(including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of 
government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the 
same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and 
substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability 
under section 9607 of this title. 
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CERCLA § 120(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).  However, the 
existence of a waiver is only the beginning of the analysis.  What is at issue here is the 
scope of the waiver, limited as it is to the extent of liability of a private party.
 The government proffers a construction of CERCLA's waiver of sovereign immunity 
that subjects it to liability when it is acting or has acted like a "nongovernmental 
entity," such as by owning facilities, but not when it is conducting a sovereign's purely 
regulatory actions in connection with the operations of a private, for-profit entity.  
Thus, under the government's analysis, its operation of facilities such as a federal park 
or an army base or naval vessel would subject it to "operator" or "owner" liability under 
CERCLA but its regulation of private parks or other private facilities would not, even if 
that regulation may result in the discharge of hazardous waste. I find the government's 
construction of the statute      reasonable insofar as it would cover government ownership 
or operation of facilities, as opposed to government regulation of private facilities.
 The majority construes the waiver to provide that "when the government engages 
in activities that would make a private party liable . . . then the government is also 
liable . . . even if no private party could in fact engage in those activities." Majority 
Typescript Op. at 17-18 (emphasis omitted).  That construction of the statute is 
illogical, not much different than saying that birds are required to have passports to fly 
across the borders of nations that require people to have passports. The fact is that 
there are some activities inherent in the role of government which no private party can 
replicate, and mobilizing the private economy in the war effort, the activity at issue 
here, is one of them.0    
                     
0While the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue, see Berkovitz v. United States
486 U.S. 531, 535 n.2 (1988); United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense 
(Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 815 n.12 (1984), courts have generally held that the 
similar waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act does not extend to the 
exercise of regulatory power because there are no private analogs to the government's 
regulatory power over its citizens.  See, e.g., Meyers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890, 905 
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 Admittedly there are some government activities that may fairly be included 
within the rubric of regulation that can be performed by private parties, and the 
operation of a lighthouse, prominently emphasized by the majority, is one of these.  
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955).  In contrast, there are some 
regulatory activities reserved exclusively to the federal government, such as winning a 
war, and it is these types of activities to which the waiver of sovereign immunity set 
forth in section 120(a)(1) of CERCLA does not extend.  See The Federalist No. 41, at 269 
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("Security against foreign danger is one of the 
primitive objects of civil society.  It is an avowed and essential object of the American 
Union.  The powers requisite for attaining it, must be effectively confided to the federal 
councils."); cf. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-42 (1950) (government not 
liable under Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to members of the armed forces incident 
to service, in part because "no private individual has power to conscript or mobilize a 
private army with such authorities over persons as the Government vests in echelons of 
command"); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, 769 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1985) 
("Although judges must decide cases arising from fields of endeavor of which they know 
                                                                                          
(6th Cir. 1994) (sovereign immunity not waived for suit alleging negligent mine inspection 
because enforcing safety regulations is a "situation[] in which only governments can find 
themselves and, therefore, ordinary state-law principles of private liability do not, and 
cannot, apply"); Akutowicz v. United States, 859 F.2d 1122, 1126 (2d Cir. 1988) (sovereign 
immunity not waived for suit challenging decertification of person's national citizenship 
because "the withdrawal of a person's citizenship constitutes a quasi-adjudicative action 
for which no private analog exists"); C.P. Chem. Co. v. United States, 810 F.2d 34, 37 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (sovereign immunity not waived for suit alleging improper promulgation of 
administrative regulation because "the United States cannot be held liable, for no private 
analog exists"); Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 385, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(separate opinion of Bork, J.) (sovereign immunity not waived for suit seeking damages for 
ultra vires regulation because "quasi-legislative or quasi-adjudicative action by an 
agency of the federal government is action of the type that private persons could not 
engage in"); McMann v. Northern Pueblos Enterprises, 594 F.2d 784, 785-86 (10th Cir. 1979) 
("As the Miller Act deals exclusively with federal contracts, private persons would never 
be in a position to require the posting of a Miller Act bond by a contractor.  It follows 
that private persons could not possibly be liable for any negligent failure to insist on 
the posting of such a bond.  Since a private person could not be liable for such failure, 
the United States could not be under the provisions of the Federal Torts Claims Act.").
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little, their otherwise omnicompetence confronts its limits in military matters.  At this 
point, it must be acknowledged, separation of powers becomes a proper concern."), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986) (quotation omitted). 
 Even the majority, as sweeping as its opinion is, recognizes that it is no
to eliminate all distinctions between the liability of the federal government and that of 
a private party.  Instead, the majority finds an "implied" exception to its view of an 
unlimited waiver for those instances when the federal government acts "solely with the 
purpose of cleaning up hazardous materials," believing that such an exception furthers the 
"essential purpose" of CERCLA.  Majority Typescript Op. at 22-23.0  I believe, however, 
that by limiting its implied exceptions solely to those that further CERCLA's purpose, the 
majority ignores the important obligations the federal government has outside the 
environmental arena. 
                     
0The majority relies on Congress's inclusion of an express statutory exemption for such 
activities by state and local governments and then states that it "believe[s] that 
Congress intended to treat the federal government in the same manner as state and local 
governments."  Majority Typescript Op. at 22.  It cites no support for this assertion and 
it would seem to be a difficult proposition to sustain, particularly in light of the 
majority's insistence that any exception for activities of the federal government be 
explicit.  Congress has treated federal and state governments differently throughout the 
statute's existence. While the federal government's sovereign immunity was waived in 1980 
to some extent, see Pub. L. No. 96-510, Title I, § 107(g), 94 Stat. 2767, 2783 (1980), the 
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity was not abrogated until six years later, see Pub. L. 
No. 99-499, Title I, § 101(b)(1), 100 Stat. 1614, 1615 (1986) (codified at CERCLA § 
101(20)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1988)), and then only with explicit provisions to 
protect state and local governments (but not the federal government) from liability 
arising out of "actions taken in response to an emergency created by the release . . . of 
a hazardous substance generated by or from a facility owned by another person."  See
107(d)(2), 100 Stat. at 1629 (codified at CERCLA §107(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) 
(1988)).   
 
 Furthermore, the majority's implication of an exception for federal cleanup of 
hazardous materials from the waiver of sovereign immunity makes the statute's explicit 
exception for cleanup by state governments in section 107(d)(2) redundant because section 
101(20)(D) abrogates the states' sovereign, i.e. Eleventh Amendment, immunity in language 
virtually identical to its waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity. 
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 For example, in discussing the government's attempt to regulate the domestic 
economy to increase production during World War II, the Supreme Court has noted that the 
government had "a primary obligation to bring about whatever production of war equipment 
and supplies shall be necessary to win a war."  Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 
765-66 (1948) (emphasis added). There is a coincidental irony that the majority's opinion 
comes shortly after the 50th Anniversary of D-Day, when the attention of the nation and 
the media were focused on the crucial role in winning the war played by American industry.  
See, e.g., ABC World News Tonight: Look Back at Preparations for D-Day Invasion, (ABC 
television broadcast May 31, 1994) ("America's vast production might was mobilized to 
defeat Hitler.  The U.S. war industries performed miracles."); ABC World News Tonight: 
Homefront Workers Made World War II Victory Possible, (ABC television broadcast June 1, 
1994) (Hitler "lost the battle of production.  Before he lost anything else, he lost the 
battle of production.").   
 Only the federal government - and exclusively the federal government - had the 
power and the ability to organize the myriad details needed to accomplish this overarching 
goal. Yet it is precisely this organization - the allocation of essential resources, the 
specification of production quotas, the arrangement of manpower, and the control of prices 
to prevent runaway inflation - on which the majority bases its imposition of liability.  
Certainly no private party could have engaged in such activity, and the majority offers 
not one shred of evidence that when Congress limited its waiver of sovereign immunity to 
actions for which a nongovernmental entity would be liable, it intended to waive liability 
for these unique activities. 
 Instead, it is when the government undertakes to respond to society's problems 
through operation of its own facilities (as distinguished from regulating the conduct of 
others), for example a government hospital, prison or military base, that its activities 
are analogous to those of private parties, and it is consequently subject to "operator" 
liability under CERCLA.  This reading of the sovereign immunity waiver has its root in the 
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statute itself.  The placement and title of the sovereign immunity waiver in section 120 
entitled "Federal facilities" lends support to the government's proposition that the 
provision was intended only to ensure CERCLA liability for  
hazardous waste generated at federally-owned or federally- operated facilities.  See
S. Katzman, Note, The Waste of War: Government CERCLA Liability at World War II 
Facilities, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1191, 1206-07 (1993).0   
 Although the majority responds that virtually identical language appeared in the 
waiver of sovereign immunity in the original 1980 statute, and therefore placement of that 
provision in 1986 under the title "Federal facilities" has no significance, the majority 
fails to consider the likelihood that the new placement was intended to clarify the scope 
of the waiver.  In fact, remarks by Senators contemporaneous to the legislation that 
placed the waiver under the "Federal facilities" designation suggest that this was indeed 
Congress's view of the scope of the waiver, and the majority points to nothing to the 
contrary in the legislative record.  See 132 Cong. Rec. 28,413 (1986) (statement of Sen. 
Stafford) (suggesting that section 120 exists to deal with "two to three potentially 
hazardous sites at each of 473 military bases across the country" and "sites operated by 
the Department of Energy"); 131 Cong. Rec. 24,733 (1985) (statement of Sen. Wilson) ("By 
Federal facilities, we are talking primarily of military bases, although the Department of 
Energy has a few sites . . . and the Department of the Interior has some hazardous waste 
cleanup responsibilities as well.").0 
                     
0The majority errs in suggesting that my reading of the waiver would preclude holding the 
government liable in cases like Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 62 U.S.L.W. 4441 (U.S. 
June 6, 1994), where the Air Force agreed to pay the EPA for a portion of a cleanup of a 
local landfill in which it had deposited liquid chemicals.  Majority Typescript Op. at 25 
n.2.  Nothing in my construction of the statute precludes liability of the government for 
operating its own facility or arranging for the disposal of its own hazardous waste.  My 
position that purely regulatory activities are not encompassed in the government's CERCLA 
liability would not have shielded it in Key Tronic, where, as distinguished from its 
regulation in this case, the Air Force disposed of waste it had generated at a landfill, 
just as private entities do every day. 
0Neither of the statutory provisions relied upon by the majority supports its position 
that the CERCLA sovereign immunity waiver encompasses the government's regulatory 
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 Reading the waiver in this manner does not nullify it. Studies suggest tha
there are numerous government facilities dangerous enough to fall within the ambit of 
CERCLA, see Stan Millan, Federal Facilities and Environmental Compliance:  Toward a 
Solution, 36 Loy. L. Rev. 319, 321-24 (1990) (discussing scope of problem); 57 Fed. 
31,758 (July 17, 1992) (list of 1,709 federal facilities for potential inclusion on 
National Priorities List), and Congress was certainly aware of this, see, e.g., H. R. Rep. 
No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2840; 
also Review of Hazardous Waste Disposal Practices at Federal Facilities:  Hearing Before a 
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3, 176
215-17 (1983). 
 In our recent opinion in United States v. Rohm and Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1278 
(3d Cir. 1993), we held that the government could not recover from private parties the 
cost of government oversight of the removal and remedial activity performed and paid for 
by a private party.  We recognized the incomparability between government and private 
action, and were unwilling to read CERCLA as treating government cleanups and private 
cleanups as equivalent actions for purposes of recovery of costs.  See id. at 1277-
noted that it was "far more likely that Congress viewed EPA's overseeing of a private 
party's removal activities as qualitatively different from EPA's actually performing 
removal activities."  Id. at 1277 (emphasis added). 
                                                                                          
activities at issue here.  There is no reason why section 107(b), which lists three 
defenses such as act of God and act of war to section 107 liability, would also have 
specified a regulatory defense, as the majority argues, inasmuch as Congress had elsewhere 
limited the government's liability to activity analogous to that of nongovernmental 
entities, i.e. in section 120(a). 
 
 The other statutory provision referred to by the majority, section 107(d)(
and previously discussed at note 2 supra, immunizes state and local governments from 
liability for certain cleanup activities of "a hazardous substance generated by or from a 
Facility owned by another person."  This provision thus posits that the state and local 
governments would be otherwise liable.  The failure to include the federal government in 
the provision suggests that Congress did not envision liability for the federal government 
comparable to that of state and local governments, and therefore it was unnecessary to 
include it in the section 107(d)(2) immunity. 
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 Of particular significance here, we stated in Rohm and Haas that the 
government's oversight "is intended to protect the public interest rather than the 
interests of those being overseen," and that therefore the government could not recover 
its administrative costs from the regulated parties without "a clear statement of 
congressional intent."  Id. at 1273-74.  A similar analysis is appropriate here in the 
converse of the Rohm and Haas situation, where we are considering the government's 
liability for payment rather than its ability to receive payment. Just as the government's 
oversight in Rohm and Haas was sui generis in the sense that it could not be performed by 
a private party, so also was the government's activity in wartime in mobilizing private 
industry to produce necessary supplies. 
 If there were any ambiguity about the scope of the government's sovereign 
immunity waiver, we would be obliged to apply the generally accepted principle that a 
waiver of sovereign immunity "must be strictly construed in favor of the United States, 
and not enlarged beyond what the language of the statute requires."  United States v. 
Idaho, 113 S. Ct. 1893, 1896 (1993) (emphasis added, quotation omitted).  As Justice 
Scalia wrote for the Court: 
The foregoing [interpretations] are assuredly not the only readings of 
[the provision], but they are plausible ones--which is enough to 
establish that a reading imposing monetary liability on the Government 
is not "unambiguous" and therefore should not be adopted.  Contrary to 
respondent's suggestion, legislative history has no bearing on the 
ambiguity point.  As in the Eleventh Amendment context, the 
"unequivocal expression" of elimination of sovereign immunity that we 
insist upon is an expression in statutory text.  If clarity does not 
exist there, it cannot be supplied by a committee report. 
 
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1016 (1992) (citation omitted).
 This rule of strict construction applies even if the statute as a whole is 
remedial in nature.  See Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986) (Title 
VII); Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 19-20 (3d Cir. 1975) 
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(Federal Tort Claims Act), overruled in part by Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 318 
(3d Cir. 1981) (in banc), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).    
 Indeed, while the majority relies on CERCLA's policy of internalizing the costs 
of waste cleanups, it ignores the countervailing policy interests that underlie the rule 
of sovereign immunity.  As we noted in another context, when construing a waiver of 
sovereign immunity we must remember that "the process of governing almost always helps 
some and hurts others."  Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. United States, 919 F.2d 888, 890 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (quoting 5 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 27.11 (1983)), cert. 
500 U.S. 941 (1991).  To permit courts to extract money damages from the government for 
its regulatory activities "would necessarily involve a very substantial, if not 
prohibitive, social cost not only in terms of the imposed liability itself, but also in 
terms of the constraining effect of that liability on the decisions of governmental 
policymakers."  Id.; see also Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity
Vand. L. Rev. 1529, 1531 (1992) (Sovereign immunity "plays a vital role in our system; it 
is not so much a barrier to individual rights as it is a structural protection for 
democratic rule.").  We concluded that "[i]n the absence of compelling evidence to the 
contrary, we will decline to assume that Congress intended to impose that social cost on 
the federal government."  Sea-Land, 919 F.2d at 890. 
 In this case there is no compelling evidence demonstrating that when Congress 
enacted CERCLA in 1980, or amended it in 1986, it unmistakably intended to hold the 
government financially liable for the environmental consequences of its mobilization of 
domestic industry to increase production of numerous scarce products and materials that 
were indisputably needed in the war effort.  The government produced evidence that during 
World War II, executive agencies closely regulated dozens of industries across the economy 
at least to the same degree as here.  Indeed, the government has demonstrated that the 
district court's opinion is already being used as the basis for numerous suits against the 
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government asserting claims for CERCLA contributions in a wide variety of industries 
arising from regulatory activity during World War II. 
 While it is not beyond Congress's power to do so, it is difficult to imagine 
that by the words of section 120 Congress intended to impose massive liability on the 
United States for the environmental consequences of this regulation, running into the 
hundreds of millions of dollars (estimated by the government to be between $26 and $78 
million in this case alone), without some reference in the legislative history to its 
intent to do so.  I therefore believe the district court should have granted the 
government's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the waiver of sovereign 
immunity contained in section 120(a)(1) of CERCLA did not encompass the activities on 
which FMC predicated its claim against the government for operator and arranger liability.
II. 
 Moreover, even if Congress had not limited its waiver of the government's 
sovereign immunity to liability to the same extent as that of any nongovernmental entity, 
the district court's judgment would still be erroneous because an examination of the 
relevant facts demonstrates that the activities relied on by it and the majority are 
insufficient to render the government an "operator" of the American Viscose facility.  The 
majority's definition of "operators" for CERCLA purposes is unassailable: "operators" are 
persons who exercise "actual and substantial control over 'the corporations's day-to
operations and its policy-making decisions.'"  Majority Typescript Op. at 28 (quoting 
Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1222 (3d Cir. 1993)).  
Even the district court recognized that "'nuts-and-bolts' management decisions [are] 
necessary for [operator] liability under CERCLA."  FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of 
Commerce, No. 90-1761, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8902, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 18, 1990).
 The facts adduced by FMC do not evince any of the essential characteristics of 
"operation."  Although a litany of factual conclusions adduced by the majority may appear, 
on the surface, to suggest the type of control at which the CERCLA operator liability is 
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directed, careful parsing of those conclusions demonstrates their evanescence.  The 
majority summarizes the facts on which it rests its conclusion of operation as follows: 
(1) the government's "diver[sion of] American Viscose from its previous commercial 
endeavors;" (2) the maintenance by the government of "a significant degree of control over 
the production process through regulations, on-site inspectors, and the possibility
seizure" if American Viscose had not followed the government's specifications; (3) the 
"government built or had built plants supplying raw materials to American Viscose, 
controlled these plants, arranged for an increased labor force, and supervised employee 
conduct;" (4) "the government supplied machinery and equipment for use in the 
manufacturing process;" and (5) "the government controlled product marketing and price."  
Majority Typescript Op. at 30 (emphasis added).  I will consider each in turn, because I 
believe that none of these facts individually nor all of them together sufficed to make 
the government an operator of the privately owned, privately financed, and for-private
profit plant. 
 The diversion of "American Viscose from its previous commercial endeavors" as 
part of the overall war effort can hardly, in and of itself, have rendered the government 
an operator of the plant.  The War Production Board (WPB), the point agency during World 
War II, was authorized through Executive Orders to "'[f]ormulate and execute in the public 
interest all measures needful and appropriate in order . . . to increase, accelerate, and 
regulate the production and supply of materials . . . required for the national defense
See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 786 F. Supp. 471, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1992) 
(quoting Exec. Order No. 8629, 6 Fed. Reg. 191 (1941) (citing Exec. Order No. 9040, 7 Fed. 
Reg. 527 (1942)).  Its directives had the force of law.  See id. at 475. 
 The principal focus of the mobilization of private industry in the war effort 
was to coordinate procurement policy for goods and scarce materials vital to the war 
effort and to allocate resources to ensure their availability for fulfillment of 
government military contracts.  This required that firms give military needs priority, but 
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only if the government met regularly established prices and terms of sale.  If a 
manufacturer declined to give the requested priority, the government had the power to take 
over the facility for "fair and just" compensation.  It is important to emphasize that 
under the majority's conclusion that the arrangement by which American Viscose produced 
high tenacity rayon for needed tires and/or that the specification of the amount of 
material needed made the government an "operator," the government would literally have 
"operated" a large portion of the country's heavy production facilities during the war.  
Instead, for the most part it left them in private hands.   
 The Supreme Court itself has recognized that for the most part the government 
did not choose to "operate" private industry in the war effort.  See Lichter v. United 
States, 334 U.S. 742, 766 (1948) (Congress chose not to "convert[] the nation in effect 
into a totalitarian state" by operating all domestic industry and instead carefully 
regulated to "reach[] unequalled productive capacity and yet retain[] the maximum of 
individual freedom consistent with a general mobilization of effort").  The issuance of 
directives to American Viscose does not evidence the type of "nuts and bolts" direct 
management of the internal workings of the "facility" necessary to achieve operator 
status. See United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 The majority's second fact, that the government maintained a "significant degree 
of control" over the production process, appears on its face to bring the government 
closer to "operator" status than any of the majority's other facts. However, when the 
basis for this conclusion is examined, it too falls short.  Notably, the majority does not 
conclude, nor could it on this record, that the government exercised de facto day-to
control.  After all, American Viscose management continued firmly in place.  Instead the 
majority refers to the "possibility of seizure" by the government of the plant, without 
acknowledging that the mere "possibility" could not make it an "operator" unless and until 
it exercised that power.  Although the potential of seizure may have had an in terrorem
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effect by encouraging or coercing producers to comply with the government's requirements, 
the potential of seizure is not operation of the plant.   
 The "regulations" referred to but not identified by the majority in reaching its 
conclusion do not differ in character from those applicable to all industries producing 
essential products during that period.  It is a fact of life that during the war, 
production of consumer goods such as nylon stockings and rayon underwear was circumscribed 
by the government, even for producers who were inclined to put frivolous consumer items 
above tires and parachutes needed by the military.  It has not previously been suggested 
by any court that the regulations accomplishing this made the government an operator of 
the plants in all of the affected industries.  Finally, the "on-site inspector" referred 
to by the majority in its discussion is duplicative of the similar references made in its 
third factual conclusion and is best understood in that context. 
 In examining the third of the facts on which the majority relies to demonstrate 
day-to-day control (built and controlled raw material plants, arranged for an increased 
labor plant, and supervised employees), we must once again consider each of the 
components.  The majority relies on the government's construction of a sulfuric acid plant 
which it owned but leased to General Chemical Company and its sponsorship of the 
construction of a carbon bisulfide plant by Stauffer Chemical Company, both of which 
provided raw materials needed by American Viscose in its production of high tenacity 
rayon.  Significantly the raw materials at issue were sold to American Viscose by others, 
not by the government.  Moreover, although the sulfuric acid plant was adjacent to the 
American Viscose facility, the sulfuric acid plant was not the relevant "facility" at 
issue in the CERCLA cleanup.  It follows that the government's involvement in the sulfuric 
acid plant's construction and operation does not impact on whether the government operated 
the American Viscose plant a different "facility." 
 Thus, the persuasiveness of the third of the majority's relevant "facts" depends 
on the government's involvement with American Viscose's employees, which it refers to in 
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the summary as the government's "arrang[ing] for an increased labor force [] and 
supervis[ion] of employee conduct."  Majority Typescript Op. at 30.  To be sure, there was 
an on-site government representative who assisted American Viscose employees in an effort 
to reduce shortages of housing and community services, and who assisted American Viscose 
in minimizing labor strife and absenteeism, but that representative did not control the 
workers. There is no evidence that it was anyone other than American Viscose supervisors 
who directed the productive employees in where to work within the plant, what shift to 
work, when or if to take a vacation, what days to work, and all the details that go into 
employee supervision.0 
 While we agree with the majority that the government was interested in insuring 
that American Viscose increased the production of a scarce resource, it is factually 
incorrect to give the impression that the government was supervising operating personnel 
at the American Viscose plant or had an input in the firing or retention of American 
Viscose's employees.  Instead the documents discussed by the majority, Majority Typescript 
Op. at 32-33, reinforce the premise that while government officials were concerned about 
the activities at the plant, their actions were in response to American Viscose's r
for assistance rather than part of any overarching scheme to control the workings of the 
plant.0  Thus the majority has arrived at its conclusion of day-to-day operational control 
                     
0The district court grouped a series of findings under the heading "Government On-Site 
Presence at the Facility," FMC, 786 F. Supp. at 481, which give the erroneous impression 
that government personnel were supervising plant operations.  In fact, the government 
personnel referred to in those findings were merely supervising installation of the 
government-owned spinning wheels in the plant by a government selected contractor, for 
which the government has accepted ownership responsibility. Examination of the relevant 
documents makes clear that the references to "the project" or "on-site" are to the 
construction and installation of the spinning wheels.  There is simply no evidence on the 
record that the government personnel supervised any American Viscose employee in 
connection with the production of rayon, and to the extent that any findings by the 
district court so suggest, they would be clearly erroneous. 
0For example, the majority's reliance on a WPB representative's statement that "[i]t was 
agreed on unanimously that a WPB Prio[r]ities man [is] needed on the Housing situation," 
App. at 1720, is misplaced because the statement was the conclusion of a series of events 
initiated by American Viscose's request for trailers to house its workers.  Initially, a 
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by the government based on unsupported or irrelevant snippets of findings by the district 
court. 
 The majority's fourth fact is that the government leased machinery and equipment 
to American Viscose.  The simplest response is that the government has already accepted 
"owner" liability for the equipment it owned at the facility.  To count these items again 
in assessing "operator" liability would unjustifiably conflate these two distinct bases of 
responsibilities. 
 The majority's fifth and final fact is the government control of "product 
marketing and price."  Inasmuch as the plant was converted to high tenacity rayon for the 
war effort, it is not surprising that government regulations required that the product 
produced be sold to authorized companies, who in turn were also regulated in this regard.  
As for product marketing and price, control of price over almost all production during 
that period was effected through regulations and directives of the Office of Price 
Administration, and such regulation, while pervasive, is not the involvement in day
management decisions to which the CERCLA operator inquiry speaks.   
 One aspect of operation of a plant is conspicuously absent from the majority's 
discussion of operation - that of profit.  FMC produced no evidence that American Viscose, 
                                                                                          
WPB representative responded to its request by instructing another to "see that AVC puts 
through the proper form for [the] first hundred trailers."  App. at 1719.  When American 
Viscose then asked if it should prepare a site for the trailers, one WPB representative 
advised them to wait for approval, while a second stated that approval would be swift.  
Another WPB representative explained that "[t]he assignment of a priority representative 
[will be] to take an interest in this project:  To break bottlenecks," to which a fourth 
replied "A swell idea if he is a live wire." App. at 1719. 
 
 Similarly, the letter quoted by the majority between the chairman of the WPB and 
the chairman of the War Manpower Commission clearly states that the WPB is seeking to 
coordinate preparation for staffing the expanded Facility because "in the judgment of the 
local management and other responsible people" previous planning was inadequate.  App. at 
1746 (emphasis added). 
 
 Thus, instead of asserting significant control over the day-to-day operations of 
a private facility, the government attempted to ensure a coordinated response to various 
requests of American Viscose, a private for-profit plant important to the war effort.
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the real operator of the plant, who chose (as fortunately did almost all of American 
private industry) to go along with the governmental wartime regulation, was not adequately 
paid for its efforts.  The majority's suggestion that the costs of cleanup of the 
hazardous wastes produced in the process of American Viscose's production should be borne 
by society as the ultimate beneficiary of the war effort is inconsistent with CERCLA's 
approach of treating cleanup costs as part of the cost of initial production.  American 
Viscose produced high tenacity rayon which was installed by another producer in tires that 
were eventually used by the armed forces.  The fact that the government was the ultimate 
consumer of that rayon is as irrelevant in assessing the cost of cleanup at the plant 
operated by American Viscose as would be the fact that General Motors purchases and uses 
spark plugs if there was an attempt to assess against it the cost of cleanup of any 
hazardous waste generated by its independent spark plug supplier. 
 When examined, the totality of the government's procurement and allocation 
activities in the war effort simply did not constitute the type of "active[] and 
substantial[] participat[ion] in the corporation's management" necessary for liability as 
an "operator" under CERCLA.  Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1222.0 
                     
0Because the court is equally divided on the issue of the government's liability as an 
arranger, and it is our tradition not to write an opinion in that situation, I do not set 
forth what I believe are independent reasons to reverse the district court in that regard. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
 
 I am uncertain whether § 120(a)(1) of CERCLA was intended to preserve the 
sovereign immunity of the United States in situations of this kind.  The teachings of 
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) suggests to me that it should not 
be so construed.  I am confident, however, that when Congress used the word "operator" it 
did not have in mind a governmental entity whose economic interest and involvement in a 
production facility was limited to that of a regulator and ultimate consumer.  The reasons 
for my confidence on this score have been thoroughly articulated in Chief Judge Sloviter's 
dissent. 
 I, therefore, respectfully dissent and join Section II of the Chief Judge's 
opinion. 
